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THE GOSPEL OF EVE:  
FRANCIS BACON, GENESIS, AND THE TELOS OF MODERN SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT:  
 
At the dawn of the scientific revolution, Francis Bacon declared its goal: to recover 
the estate of Adam and restore man's prelapsarian dominion over nature.  Bacon's 
analogy makes little sense as a rationale for scientific inquiry, however, since 
Adam's distinguishing virtue in the opening verses of Genesis was his incurious 
obedience. The animating spirit of science has always been the impudent curiosity of 
Eve, who conversed with the serpent and dared, in defiance of the threat of death, to 
taste the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge. As we apply the fruits of scientific 
inquiry to the creation of new technologies, this contrast between the mythical 
mother and father of our species takes on a fatal significance. If we aim to recover 
the estate of Adam, we put science in the service of an incurious domination of 
nature that will end in catastrophe. Conversely, when we follow the example of Eve, 
we engage in a dialogue with nature inspired by that transcendent curiosity which 
Einstein identified as ‘the cosmic religious sense.’ Informed by this ethos, the 
sustaining goal of science is not to master nature or banish death, but to deepen our 
understanding of nature, and our engagement with life. 
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The name and logo of Apple, Inc. were first inspired by Steve Jobs’ fruitarian 
diet, and his desire for a moniker that would be “fun, spirited . . . and get us ahead of 
Atari in the telephone book.” (Isaacson 2011: 63).  In spite of its humble beginnings, the 
Apple trademark [Figure 1] would become one of the most recognized corporate logos on 
earth before the end of the twentieth century (Klara 2011).  Whatever its original intent, 
the silhouette of an apple marked by a single bite is an image that draws more than a little 
bit of its power from a tacit invocation of the Genesis tale. It may seem fitting that an 
image connoting the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge would become one of the 
most recognized icons of the information revolution, but it should not be surprising.  In 
the earliest days of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century, the myth of Adam 
and Eve provided ample inspiration to Sir Francis Bacon [Figure 2] and to the founders 
of the Royal Society, as they attempted to promote the advancement of scientific research 
on a scale that they believed would transform the world. For Bacon, the ultimate goal of 
scientific research was nothing less than to restore the full dominion over nature that 
Adam enjoyed before the Fall of Man.  In the twenty-first century, as a global ecological 
crisis compels us to reevaluate the Baconian dream of subjugating nature, we must also 
reexamine the religious tropes that he employed to justify that dream. In particular, the 
story of Adam and Eve offers two quite distinct models of scientific inquiry, which entail 
radically different ways of thinking about nature.   
 
 
Bacon’s name is often associated with his conviction that knowledge is power, 
and with his determination to systemize the acquisition of nature’s well-kept secrets for 
the central purpose of attaining power over nature. This description of Bacon is largely 
accurate, but it is also colored by the spectacular success of state-sponsored research 
programs, such as the Royal Society of London for the Improvement of Natural 
Knowledge, that Bacon never lived to see. It is worth remembering that in Bacon’s time 
his proposals for state-sponsored scientific research were rejected repeatedly by the 
courts of both Elizabeth I and James I, as well as by such esteemed confidants as the 
pioneering Oxford scholar Sir Thomas Bodley. Even when the realm was in imminent 
danger, as when England faced the threat of invasion by Spain in the late sixteenth 
century, royal authorities were more likely to entertain the mystical promises of 
alchemists who claimed that they could fill the coffers of the treasury with gold than to 
hear Bacon’s pleas for funding methodical experimentation to advance the applied 
sciences (Farrington 1963: 34-40).  
 
 
  Bacon knew that his vision of scientific research would only take flight after he 
had effected a fundamental change in the way his own generation or a future generation 
saw the world. Bacon proved equal to this task. Though he could only speculate about the 
power of science to transform the world, he knew from experience about the power of 
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metaphors to transform the thinking of his fellow human beings. Bacon’s 
experimentation with every metaphor at hand to advance his cause is testament to both 
his imagination and to his rigorous empiricism. From the literature of sixteenth century 
England, he took the template of Thomas More’s Utopia, tore out its ruminations about 
the abolition of private property, and replaced it with vision of an island kingdom 
committed to state funded research and the production of useful technologies. This new 
utopia, which Bacon described in the New Atlantis, promised to solve the problem of 
destabilizing poverty not by cutting the pie into more even slices, but by expanding it 
indefinitely through science and technology. Though this was a manuscript that he did 
not live to finish, the vision that he sketched in this fantastic traveler’s tale has lost none 
of its power. Observing contemporary discussions about the transformation of nature, the 
historian of science Rosalind Williams has argued that the phrase ‘human empire,’ which 
Bacon coined in the New Atlantis, remains at least as descriptive as any neologisms such 
as the ‘Anthropocene’ (Williams 2013: 18). 
 
  In addition to stealing a trope or two from Thomas More, Bacon reached back 
further and ransacked the classical world in search of handy metaphors. From the 
Romans he took the idea of the instauratio. This was the practice of beginning a great 
enterprise again after consulting with the oracles, and it furnished the title for Bacon’s 
work The Great Instauration, in which he argued that the pursuit of knowledge required a 
new beginning based not on textual authority but on the direct study of nature. From the 
classical tradition, Bacon borrowed with abandon, reinterpreting the stories of Daedalus, 
Atalanta, Diomede, and Proteus, among many others to illustrate both the ethos and the 
enormous rewards of scientific research. As he attempted to persuade elites in 
Renaissance England to invest in empirical research, Bacon knew that classical 
mythology would hold a strong appeal for his audience. In 1609, he published The 
Wisdom of the Ancients, “directly interpreting eleven of the thirty-one fables in terms of 
newly emergent science” (Pesic 1999: 83). 
 
  It was in the Bible, however, that Bacon found the most enduring metaphors, and 
those with the greatest potential to lend religious and political legitimacy to his cause for 
the broadest possible audience.  In 1611, the King James Bible made the story of creation 
as depicted in Genesis more widely available to ordinary English speakers than it had 
ever been before. As literacy grew steadily in England and its colonies over the course of 
the next three centuries, it would be this depiction of Adam and Eve that would become 
the most widely referenced, not only in religious contexts, but also in popular culture.  
For generations, cultural conservatives have cited Genesis as a stable model for the 
divinely sanctioned relationship between men, women, and nature. There is some irony in 
this. Like the earliest forms of matter described by the Big Bang theory, this text is highly 
unstable. In its first reference to the creation of the sexes, Genesis 1:27 states, ‘So God 
created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female 
created he them.’ Some seventeenth-century commentators used this language to fashion 
the intriguing argument that Adam was originally a hermaphrodite, but the third person 
plural pronoun here clearly denotes two individuals, one male, one female, each ‘in the 
image of God.’  Several verses later, a more patriarchal narrative emerges. Woman, 
having been created in the first chapter of Genesis in the image of God, is somehow 
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created again in the second chapter, this time out of Adam’s side. Identified as ‘woman, 
because she was taken out of man,’ in Genesis 2:23, she is relegated to a lesser status, 
even before her encounter with the serpent and the Tree of Knowledge. 
 
As a sort of junior partner to God, Adam is deputized before the Fall to rule all of 
creation and to assign the correct name to every living thing on earth. Because his ability 
to name his fellow creatures and his God-given right to exercise dominion over them go 
hand in hand, his naming of woman underlines his tacit dominion over her. After the Fall, 
he will name her again, calling her ‘Eve’ for the first time. Adam’s vocation for naming 
the elements of creation, including his helpmate, was seen as the earliest example of an 
activity resembling science depicted in the Bible. In a primeval antecedent to the Systema 
Naturae of Linnaeus, Adam attempts to bring order to the chaos of nature by dividing all 
he sees into a set of clear and namable categories.  
 
The idea of an Adamic language assigning an unequivocal and correct name to 
everything in nature continued to inspire natural philosophers during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and was cited by Linnaeus himself as a model for his elaborate 
taxonomy of living things (Fara 2003: 29). A decade after his death in 1778, the Linnean 
Society was formed to “carry on his botanical work in the same mingled spirit of 
Christian reverence, natural piety, and practical enterprise” (Worster 1994: 33). Since the 
Darwinian revolution, we have become accustomed to thinking of the natural sciences 
and the Genesis tale as being diametrically opposed, but this obscures a key ancestral trait 
that they share. The power to name things, supported by the claim that those names are 
unambiguously accurate, would become essential to the political and social authority of 
science in the modern age.  
 
When Bacon alluded to Genesis, he invited readers to contemplate the position of 
complete ease and dominion over nature that Adam and Eve enjoyed before the Fall, and 
he promised that through the methodical and empirical study of nature, it would be 
possible to attain that state once again.  Playing on the old proverb that ‘truth is the 
daughter of time’ Bacon promised that the new form of knowledge derived from 
scientific research would be the ‘son of time’ or Temporis Partus Masculus or ‘the male 
birth of time’ (Farrington 1963: 31). Although Bacon did not live to see the founding of 
the Royal Society in 1660, he was credited by its founders as their chief inspiration. As if 
to affirm Bacon’s vision of methodical science as ‘the male birth of time,’ no woman 
would be admitted to the ranks of the Royal Society until the spring of 1945 (Ogilvie and 
Harvey 2003: 804).  
 
The second half of the twentieth century saw a gradual rise in the number of 
women recognized for their scientific work, and it was also during this period that 
Bacon’s framing of scientific inquiry as a tool for the domination of nature would 
become subject to growing criticism from a wide array of scholars. A passionate rejection 
of Bacon’s stated goal in Novum Organum of ‘the dominion of the human race itself over 
the universe’ was articulated by such Frankfurt School critics as Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno in the late 1940s, and further developed by Carolyn Merchant and the 
founders of the eco-feminist movement in the 1980s and ’90s. These authors presented a 
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bold critique of Bacon’s approach to science, but they tended to conflate Bacon’s 
shortcomings with a broader sense of despair about what science itself had become in the 
twentieth century, condemning it as a cultural construct tied to the power of patriarchy 
and colonialism. In his book, The Serpent’s Gift, the noted scholar of religious studies 
Jeffery Kripal points to the constricting nature of this constructivist approach to 
knowledge: ‘If Kant’s Enlightenment shouts ‘Dare to know!’ the motto of 
postmodernism sometimes becomes ‘How dare you know!’’  As this postmodern critique 
of science has gained ground, Kripal observes that ‘Knowledge has in effect become a 
form of evil, a sin, and the petty God of Genesis is now joined by the petty gods of every 
other religion and culture in a desperate attempt to keep us all locked in a thousand 
premodern gardens of imagined ethnic, religious, and political purity.’ Alluding to the 
violence spawned by religious fundamentalism, Kripal muses that he ‘can think of few 
worlds more dangerous than this one’ (2007: 10). 
 
If we are disturbed by the excesses of anti-rational rhetoric and violence in our 
own time, we must not forget that much of it has come as a reaction the purportedly 
rational rhetoric and violence of the mid-twentieth century. In the Cold War decades, the 
horrors of American war in Vietnam and the mad logic of the nuclear arms race made the 
pretensions of technocracy a natural target for cultural critics of all stripes. Unfortunately, 
the crucial distinction between the blithely optimistic scientism that colored the rhetoric 
of both state propaganda and corporate ad copy in the mid-twentieth century and the 
inquisitive practice of science itself was often lost in the mix. As a practicing scientist, 
Rachel Carson, was thoroughly prepared to highlight this distinction. When Robert 
White-Stevens, the glib spokesman for American Cyanamid donned a white lab coat and 
told television viewers in 1962 that ‘the modern scientist believes that man is steadily 
controlling nature’ Carson was able to expose his argument as scientifically unsound 
(Des Jardins 2010: 286). White-Stevens had attempted to portray Carson as a hysterical 
woman and an enemy of modern science, but she responded with a calm analysis of the 
environmental impact of DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons that was well 
supported by peer-reviewed research. Though she could write like a poet, her strategy for 
combatting corporate pseudo-science about the ‘control of nature’ was to rebut it with the 
most current science about the complexity of ecological systems (Lear 1997: 447-452). 
 
In subsequent decades, such appeals to the authority of scientific research were 
undermined by a growing tendency to conceptualize the enterprise of science itself as 
little more than a cultural construct. However, as long as one is careful to make the 
distinction between the practice of science and the rhetoric of science, it is possible to 
discern what is valuable in both the cultural critique of Western science that gathered so 
much force in the late twentieth century, and in the practice of science itself. Carolyn 
Merchant’s Reinventing Eden shines a bright light on how Christian ideas about divinely 
sanctioned patriarchy and man’s dominion over nature shaped the evolution of Western 
science from the seventeenth century through the twentieth (2003). On the other hand, the 
value of scientific inquiry in advancing the cause of gender equality has been 
wonderfully illustrated in Kimberly A. Hamlin’s book From Eve to Evolution. Tracing 
the parallel histories of science and feminism in the late nineteenth century, Hamlin 
explores how the advent of Darwinian evolution provided new leverage for feminists in 
	 5	
the United States in their struggle to attain equal rights for women, precisely because it 
eroded the credibility of arguments, rooted in traditional interpretations of the Genesis 
story, that women must be subservient to men (2014).  
 
What is missing from the conversation about science and Genesis to date is a 
discussion of how the story of Eve exemplifies the audacity of science at least as much as 
the oft-told tales of Prometheus and Faust. When the pathfinding scientist Marie Curie 
named her younger daughter Eve, perhaps she was thinking of this connection (Quinn 
1996: 211). For the most part, however, the parallels between Eve’s experiment and 
experimental science has been overlooked, even among feminists who are committed to 
challenging traditional interpretations of Genesis. The celebrated 1970s feminist slogan 
‘Eve Was Framed’ illustrates this oversight [Figure 3] (LIFE, August 13, 1971). Even as 
it rejects the old argument that Eve was responsible for the ‘Fall’ of the human race, this 
declaration fails to question the premise of the Fall itself. The arguments presented by 
Carolyn Merchant in Reinventing Eden are more nuanced, but do not quite escape this 
confining assumption. In chapter three of Reinventing Eden, Merchant points to Lucas 
Cranach’s 1526 painting Adam and Eve [Figure 4] as yet another image that ‘made Eve 
responsible for the loss of Eden’ (2003: 53).  In the last chapter of Reinventing Eden, 
Merchant finds a hopeful alternative to such narrative imagery in the 1990 painting Adam 
& Eve by Teresa Fasolino [Figure 5] in which ‘both humans hold the apple; the snake is 
absent’ (2003: 242). 
 
 
 
The contrast between these two images illustrates the pitfalls of attempting to 
bowdlerize the Genesis story in the name of feminism, or any other cause. Cranach’s 
painting revels in the tension between what Eve already knows – and what Adam does 
not know yet – as the serpent hovers over both of their heads. In Fasolino’s painting there 
are ample good intentions, but all of the dramatic tension has been drained away by the 
artist’s removal of the serpent and revision of the narrative.  This is a great loss. The 
serpent is essential to the power of this story, as is the fact that one human being, Eve, 
made a choice to converse with the serpent and taste the fruit of knowledge in defiance of 
both divine authority and the authority of Adam. 
 
Embracing Eve’s quest for knowledge, rather than denying or diluting her choice, 
could well lead to a new instauration, not only for the cause of gender equality, but also 
for science itself.  According to the founders of the Royal Society, the supreme model of 
science was not the subversive curiosity of Eve, but the obedient and practical cataloging 
of things practiced by Adam. Adam did not speak to any of the animals in Eden, as Eve 
notoriously did, but named them and ordered them. As the Anglican cleric and cofounder 
of the Royal Society Thomas Sprat declared: 
 
This was the first service which Adam perform’d to his Creator, when he 
obey’d him in mustering, and naming, and looking into the Nature of all his 
Creatures. This had been the only religion, if man had continued innocent in 
Paradise, and had not wanted a redemption (Almond 1999: 36).  
	 6	
 
In other words, Adam’s subordinating approach to nature, exemplified by his naming the 
animals in Genesis, was exalted over Eve’s inquisitive approach to nature, exemplified by 
her conversation with the serpent. To invert this order by honoring Eve’s style of inquiry 
is not to privilege a ‘feminine’ as opposed to a ‘masculine’ epistemology. Rather, it is to 
privilege a receptive as opposed to a domineering approach to nature, predicated on 
wonder and engagement rather than ownership and control.  
 
For Bacon, as he attempted to sketch the potential of science in the early 
seventeenth century, it was paradoxically necessary for men to understand nature before 
they could dominate it. In one of his more widely cited remarks on the subject of 
experimentation, Bacon seems to present the process of investigating nature as 
indistinguishable from the process of dominating it when he observes in The Great 
Instauration that, “the nature of things betrays itself more readily under the vexations 
[vexationes] of art than in its natural freedom” (Pesic 1999:88). In other texts, however, 
Bacon points to a paradoxical tension between learning the laws of nature and applying 
those laws to the control of nature. His shortest and most memorable example of this 
paradox is his declaration in Novum Organum that “Nature, to be commanded must be 
obeyed” (Peltonen 1996:182) Nonetheless, once humanity possessed the necessary 
practical knowledge, there would be no real limit to its power. Bacon’s stated goal in 
Novum Organum was nothing less than ‘the dominion of the human race itself over the 
universe (McKnight 2006: 97).’ The environmental historian Donald Worster has 
observed that, “In the Baconian ideology, by a startling yet clear progression, the good 
shepherd of Christian tradition had become a scientist and technocrat. Science offered the 
means for building a better sheepfold and creating greener pastures” (Worster 1994: 30). 
This goal of controlling nature, though originally framed in religious terms was easily 
secularized. In the mid-nineteenth century, the young nihilist depicted in Turgenev’s 
Fathers and Sons expresses a thoroughly secular version of Bacon’s idea when he 
declares proudly, “Nature is not a temple but a workshop, and man’s the workman in it” 
(Turgenev [1862] 1965: 116). 
 
Whether it is framed in religious or secular terms, Bacon’s goal of controlling 
nature has become increasingly untenable in both theory and practice. If we think about 
this goal in light of more recent scientific discoveries such as Darwinian evolution and 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, Bacon’s rhetoric appears not merely megalomaniacal 
but more than a little bit absurd. How can a species that is a product of nature ‘control’ 
the very processes of nature from which it has emerged?  And even if such a goal made 
sense, how could human beings, given the role of contingency and complexity inherent in 
every natural process, even begin to plan a strategy for the control of nature?  Bacon’s 
ambition for the role of experimental science in human history was bold in its expression 
and unprecedented in its ambition, but very little of what he wrote about nature was based 
on a solid understanding of science, even by the standards of the seventeenth century. 
Francis Bacon was wrong about the major scientific questions of his time, rejecting the 
Copernican revolution and dismissing the groundbreaking magnetic research of his 
fellow Englishman William Gilbert as something akin to medieval alchemy (Ferris 2011: 
46).  Furthermore, while other pioneers of science, such as Giordano Bruno and Galileo, 
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made history by defying authority, Bacon was careful throughout his career to cultivate 
the best possible relations with both the court and the clergy of the Church of England.  
The science he envisioned would be both sponsored by state authority and accountable to 
it, a value reflected in the very name of the institution he inspired, i.e., The Royal 
Society. 
 
In his own reflections on the telos of science, Albert Einstein took a very different 
approach from the founders of the Royal Society, and one that was much closer to the 
example set by Eve than by Adam. Einstein defined a sense of wonder about nature not 
as an expression of the will to power but as a manifestation of what he called ‘the cosmic 
religious sense.’  Seeking knowledge about nature was a divine calling, but one that 
would necessarily defy the canons of established religion. Einstein observed that: 
 
The religious geniuses of all times have been distinguished by this cosmic 
religious sense, which recognizes neither dogmas nor God made in man’s 
image. Consequently there cannot be a church whose doctrines are based 
on the cosmic religious experience. It comes about, therefore, that 
precisely among the heretics of all ages we find men who were inspired by 
this highest religious experience; they often appeared to their 
contemporaries as atheists, but sometimes also as saints. Viewed from this 
angle, men like Democritus, Francis of Assisi, and Spinoza are near to one 
another (Einstein 1931: 49). 
 
Einstein’s celebration of radical curiosity contains an implicit warning that none of this is 
for the faint of heart. Contrary to Bacon’s promise, the pursuit of fundamental knowledge 
about the cosmos and about ourselves cannot be a path to the stability and ease that 
Bacon had imagined as the restored estate of Adam.  
 
Einstein’s own life presents a wonderful example of the instability inherent in 
scientific exploration. Resisting the randomness implicit in quantum physics, he famously 
protested to Niels Bohr that he would ‘never believe for a single moment’ that God ‘plays 
dice’ with the universe (Dukas 1979: 68).  However, Einstein lived long enough to see 
Bohr’s interpretation emerge as the dominant paradigm in physics while his own attempts 
at a unified field theory had all come to naught. Though the direction of twentieth-
century physics had not led toward the stable model that Einstein had preferred, the quest 
itself remained everything to him. In the last year of his life he wrote that he had never 
believed in a personal God, but that, ‘If there is something in me which can be called 
religious it is the unbounded admiration for the structure of the world so far as our 
science can reveal it’ (Dukas 1979: 43). Although some of Einstein’s discoveries about 
the nature of matter proved essential to the advent of nuclear weapons, this was a part of 
his legacy that caused him anguish and deep sense of responsibility rather than pride 
(Rowe and Schulmann 2007: xxix). His approach to science had little in common with 
the Baconian project of studying nature in order to control it. Einstein’s driving motive 
was a personal admiration for the beauty of the cosmos, even when its elusive nature had 
defied his most cherished expectations.   
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By the second half of the twentieth century, it became apparent to many that the 
Baconian project of mastering nature was not only wrongheaded, but profoundly 
dangerous. As a scientist herself, Rachel Carson rejected the philosophy of controlling 
nature not as patriarchal but as scientifically unsound. In Silent Spring, Carson declared, 
‘The ‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age 
of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience 
of man’ (Carson 1962: 297).  And yet, more than half a century after Carson published 
Silent Spring, it appears that we have not quite escaped ‘the Neanderthal age of biology 
and philosophy’ as schemes for the control of nature continue to proliferate. While 
transhumanist enthusiasts such as Ray Kurzweil dream of engineering eternal life for 
those who can afford to augment their brains and bodies, other cultural provocateurs such 
as Stewart Brand make the case for deliberately engineering our climate (Kurzweil 2005; 
Brand 2009). While Kurzweil and Brand exhibit ample and intelligence and declare their 
good intentions, both of these fantasies spring from a Baconian mindset in which the will 
to knowledge and the will to power are essentially indistinguishable. Against such 
notions of an air-conditioned planet peopled by immortal cyborgs, Eve’s dialogue with 
the serpent and her pursuit of knowledge for its own sake offer a welcome counter-
narrative. 
 
To praise Eve’s pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, however, raises this 
question: What kind of knowledge did the first woman unlock? Because Eve’s 
punishment is tied to sex and reproduction (i.e., Eve’s ‘curse’ in Genesis 3:16 ‘…in 
sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall 
rule over thee.’) Kripal holds the position that this knowledge was probably sexual in 
nature. On the other hand, Milton’s Paradise Lost depicts Adam and Eve as both 
innocent and sexual before the Fall. After they both taste the fruit they are aware of their 
nakedness and their sex takes on a new nature that Milton describes as sinful. No doubt 
the expansion of consciousness engendered by tasting the fruit from the Tree of 
Knowledge would change the experience of sex, but only because it would change the 
experience of virtually everything. On a fundamental level, Eve’s experiment was 
nothing more than to choose heightened awareness over placid ignorance. The same 
choice still hovers before us in the present, fraught with the same risks Eve faced as she 
listened to the serpent and plucked the fruit from the tree.  
 
For millennia the power of the Genesis story has been its claim to explain the 
origin of virtually everything, from sex to death to agriculture. It is very likely of course 
that human beings had already discovered sex, death, and agriculture long before 
anybody began to tell this tale.  So the better way to think about the Eve story is not as a 
work of history but as an extraordinarily powerful work of literature. Among the vast 
tribe of the literal-minded, which includes both militant atheists and reactionary 
fundamentalists, it is a great demotion for any story to pass from the realm of history to 
literature.  For those who understand, as Bacon did, the extraordinary power of 
metaphors, this is not a demotion for the Eve story, but a considerable promotion. History 
is the story of things that only happened once. Great literature tells us the story of things 
that happen all the time, forming part of the human condition. This is precisely what the 
	 9	
Genesis tale is. Again and again in human affairs, we struggle to create some sort of order 
out of chaos, and when we do we seek to protect that order with some form of authority. 
No form of order can be permanent, however, and no form of authority can endure for 
very long before it is challenged, not only by disobedience but also by new forms of 
knowledge that throw its very legitimacy into question. Every scientific revolution has 
followed this pattern that the mathematician John Casti has called, in an arch nod both to 
Milton and Kuhn, ‘Paradigms Lost’ (1990). 
 
  According to the ethos of theocracy, Eve’s sins are disobedience and a wayward 
curiosity. According to the ethos of science, these should be recognized as her cardinal 
virtues. What Milton called disobedience was merely Eve’s refusal to accept the word of 
others about the Tree of Knowledge and the nature of its fruit. What he and other 
orthodox Christians have condemned as a wayward curiosity is closer to what Einstein 
described as ‘the cosmic religious sense.’ Religion scholar Elaine Pagels argues that 
some gnostic Christians praised Eve’s pursuit of fundamental knowledge about the 
human condition, in stark contrast to her condemnation by more orthodox Christians such 
as Tertullian and Augustine (1988:68).  Pagels identifies one gnostic text, the Hypostasis 
of the Archons, as presenting a counter-narrative that ‘describes Eve as the spiritual 
principle in humanity who raises Adam from his merely material condition’ (1989: 31). 
In this reading, Eve’s quest for knowledge did not instigate the Fall, but rather began a 
process of spiritual ascent (or, we might say, evolution) for the human race.  
 
Among the myriad apocryphal texts that preceded the establishment and 
enforcement of Nicene Christianity, only a small fragment remains of the one entitled 
The Gospel of Eve. Cited in a fourth century commentary by the sainted Bishop 
Epiphanius of Samalis, who condemned the sect as unorthodox, this fragment of text has 
since been cited by various religious nonconformists over the centuries, from mystics to 
advocates of science and women’s equality.  In the 1880s, the prominent New York 
freethinker and feminist D. M. Bennett lamented, ‘It is greatly to be regretted that we 
have so little of this curious book preserved’ (Bennett 1881: 639). The fact that a 
nineteenth century freethinker such as Bennett should find inspiration in the fragments of 
this gnostic religious text should not be surprising. In her magisterial history of human 
doubt both within and without various religious traditions, Jennifer Michael Hecht shines 
a bright light on the many ways in which the struggles of mystics against orthodoxy in 
the ancient world have paralleled the struggles of scientists and secularists against 
religious authority in more recent times (Hecht 2003: 189-192; 206-212).  Nineteenth 
century freethinkers who advocated women’s equality and freethought found ample 
reason to praise the earliest opponents and victims of orthodoxy, from persecuted gnostic 
sects to the martyred Hypatia of Alexandria (Dzielska 1996: 11). Hence, the prominent 
British atheist Charles Bradlaugh named his daughter Hypatia, while his American 
contemporary, D. M. Bennet, was fascinated by the gnostic Gospel of Eve (Hecht 2003: 
416).  
In his two-volume work, The Gods and Religions of Ancient and Modern Times, 
Bennett quoted the surviving fragment from The Gospel of Eve as follows: 
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I was planted on a lofty mountain, and lo! I beheld a man of great stature 
and another who was mutilated. And then I heard a voice like unto 
thunder. And when I drew near, he spoke to me after this wise: I am thou 
and thou art I. And wheresoever thou art there am I, and I am dispersed 
through all. And wheresoever thou willest, there canst thou gather me; but 
in gathering me thou gatherest thyself (Bennett 1881: 639). 
 
Like many texts produced by the political, cultural, and religious ferment of the early 
Christian era, this fragment is both intriguing in its imagery and maddeningly obscure in 
its meaning. In the broadest sense, however, it seems to suggest a fundamental identity 
between the mind of an inquiring person (i.e., the narrator) and a mysterious ‘voice like 
unto thunder.’ If this voice is taken as divine, it reflects a divinity that is enmeshed in the 
fabric of the universe and within ourselves. There is a beguiling affinity between this 
unfolding conception of divinity and the process of discovery through science. The deity 
alluded to by The Gospel of Eve remains as obscure as the historical circumstances under 
which the text itself was composed, but it bears at least some similarity to what Einstein 
described in 1929 as ‘Spinoza’s God, Who reveals Himself in the lawful harmony of the 
world’ (Rowe and Schulmann 2007: 16). If the divine is immanent in oneself and in the 
fabric of the universe, Eve’s experiment with the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge is not 
the beginning of sin and death, but a step closer to an understanding of, and identity with, 
creation: ‘I am dispersed through all. . . . in gathering me thou gatherest thyself.’      
  
 This affinity between the story of Eve and the spirit of inquiry was not lost on 
some of the women who first spoke out for the cause of feminism. In 1790, a few years 
after Kant had framed Horace’s dictum Sapere Aude as the defining motto of the 
Enlightenment, the pioneering American feminist Judith Sargent Murray praised Eve as 
the nobler character in Genesis precisely because she dared to know. In her 1790 essay 
‘On the Equality of the Sexes’ Murray declared of Eve that ‘a laudable ambition fired her 
soul’ and that ambition was quite simply ‘a thirst for knowledge.’ Adam, in an act of 
acquiescence that must challenge the notion that men were the nobler and stronger sex, 
chose the path of disobedience ‘merely in compliance with the blandishments of a 
female’ (Murray 1995: 13). Judith Sargent Murray’s defense of Eve’s superior curiosity 
was echoed during the first half of the nineteenth century by other feminists such as 
Sarah Grimké and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Hamlin 2014: 31). However, as long as these 
feminists accepted the general premise that the Genesis story described the Fall of the 
human race from a state of harmony with God and nature, the idea that Eve’s motivations 
were somehow nobler than Adam’s could not fundamentally change the terms of the 
debate. Whatever her motivations had been, Eve remained the first to commit the original 
sin of disobedience. In the second half of the nineteenth century, when Darwin’s theory 
of evolution offered a clear alternative to the Genesis story, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in 
step with a younger generation of feminists, was happy to leave the story of Eve behind 
and embrace what she saw as a more scientific basis on which to make the argument for 
women’s equality (Hamlin 2014: 48-53). 
  
 And yet the Genesis tale retains its force. Bacon’s intuitive understanding of the 
power of a great story inspired his use of Greek mythology to make the case for science, 
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though none of his contemporaries took any of the Greek myths to be literally true. In our 
own time, we need not accept the literal truth of the Genesis story to appreciate its power 
as a parable about the nature of science. The story of Eve and the Tree of Knowledge 
describes the birth of science, encapsulating the key phases of a scientific experiment 
from observation and hypothesis to peer review a single verse: “And when the woman 
saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be 
desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also to her 
husband with her; and he did eat” (Genesis 6:3, King James Version).  
 
Even the ‘punishments’ that result from this act point to an epochal expansion of human 
knowledge. The fact that Eve’s primary curse is painful childbirth (‘in sorrow shalt thou 
bring forth children’) points to a correlation confirmed by evolutionary biology: 
childbirth is more painful for human females because of the extraordinary size of the 
human brain (Martin 2013: 131). Adam’s primary punishment (‘in the sweat of thy face 
shalt thou eat bread’) suggests not merely the advent of work but the invention of 
agriculture. Though big brains do make childbirth painful and agriculture does involve a 
lot of hard work, neither of these developments can sanely be reckoned as constituting a 
‘Fall’ for our species. Our oversized brains helped us develop agriculture, and agriculture 
has made it possible to refine every other accouterment of civilization, including 
wonderful and perplexing parables such as the Genesis tale. Instead of regarding Eve’s 
choice as a fatal transgression, we should see it as the beginning of a great and unfolding 
experiment in the life of the universe.  
 
For fundamentalists, the opening verses of Genesis possess the power to close the 
debate about who we are and where we came from. Skeptics and explorers should cherish 
this tale for precisely the opposite reasons. Charles Darwin once observed that, “without 
doubting there can be no progress” (Darwin [1871] 2004: 167).  The story of Eve’s 
doubting the repeated warnings about the Tree of Knowledge illustrates this point quite 
nicely. In his recent book on Adam and Eve, the literary scholar Steven Greenblatt has 
observed – and confessed – that: “Millions of people in the world, including many who 
grasp the underlying assumptions of modern science, continue to cling to the peculiar 
satisfaction that the ancient story provides. I do.”  Greenblatt ties this “peculiar 
satisfaction” to the idea that Eve’s “deliberate action” and “not an impersonal 
mechanistic process of random mutation . . . determined the shape of our lives” 
(Greenblatt 2017: 299).  Of course, the idea of “deliberate action” points to yet another 
question. The problem of free will (which those philosophers classed as “mysterians” 
believe we will never be able to answer) is a riddle that also begins with Eve’s choice to 
taste the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge.1  
 
Precisely because it involves the mystery of human choice and its consequences, 
the story of Eve’s experiment still possesses a tremendous power to pose new questions 
about who we are and where we are going. Plenty of ink has already been spilt 																																																								1	Among	the	thinker	who	are	classed	as	“mysterians”	for	their	position	on	free	will,	Martin	Gardner	listed	himself,	along	with	contemporaries	such	as	Noam	Chomsky,	Thomas	Nagel,	and	Jerry	Fodor	(Gardner 1996: 427). 	
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concerning the question of what sort of knowledge Eve discovered, and the related 
question of why that knowledge was forbidden. However, these questions have a 
multitude of companions. For example, if the language that Adam spoke when he named 
the plants and animals of Eden has been exalted as perfect and true, what about the 
tongue that Eve spoke when she conversed with the serpent? What sort of language 
would enable us to converse with nonhuman nature, as opposed to merely naming and 
classifying its menagerie? What worlds might such a language open up to us?2 If seeing 
and naming were the forms of knowing that Adam invented, what does it mean that Eve 
discovered another form of knowing that involved tasting the fruit from the Tree of 
Knowledge and ingesting its substance? We will probably never find a definitive answer 
to any of these questions, just as we have never found a clear pattern in the digits of pi or 
the golden ratio. Like these essential but irrational numbers, the story of the woman, the 
serpent, and the tree is both mystifying in its refusal to be reduced to a simple formula, 
and inspiring in its constant recurrence in our experience of nature. 
 
Every time we pursue knowledge for its own sake, we are continuing Eve's 
experiment. If we find ourselves in the walled garden of an established paradigm, we may 
be tempted to accept the structure of that paradigm with resolute faith in order to 
maintain the security of our confinement. Or we may listen to the subtleties of nature, as 
Eve listened to the subtle voice of the serpent, and test the premises that uphold the 
established order of things. This experiment always leads to our exclusion from the 
garden. If we would seek to return, we see a flaming sword in our path that illuminates 
this fact: you cannot un-know, by some act of will or even by the sincerest contrition, 
what you have come to know. Conversely, however much we come to know, we will not 
be able to banish mystery, as each tenuous extension of the borders of knowledge 
immediately expands of the frontiers of the unknown.  
 
What, we might ask, is the Gospel of Eve? How do I know?  In all seriousness, 
that is it: How do I know? or, for parties of two or more, How do we know? It is a 
declaration of both humility and faith. Humility about the limits of our knowledge and 
faith that it might be possible to know. In its humility it avoids the dead end of dogmatic 
certainty. In its faith, is eschews the arid wastelands of radical skepticism and complete 
relativism. It is worthy of being called a gospel because it offers us the good news that we 
can know more about the cosmos, but, unlike other gospels, it does not offer a path to 
some paradise, either here on earth or in the great beyond. The simple actions of Eve in 
Genesis are a stunning illustration of her gospel: if you find yourself within a paradigm 
that purports to be complete, test its limits immediately. If you find yourself in a paradise 
that purports to be eternal, look for the exit.  
																																																								2	In the 1960s, Elisabeth Mann Borgese considered this question in some depth, but the 
answer remains nearly as elusive today (Borgese 1968).	
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